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Abstract
Tie-in sales have a bad image because of anti-competitive effects. No-
tably, tying contracts allow monopolists to carry over monopoly power
into markets where they meet competition. Most of the literature as-
sumes a firm being monopolist in one market and facing competition
in another. In contrast, we analyze two firms which both are mo-
nopolists in one market and competitors in the other. Under such a
symmetric structure tying has competitive effects. Tie-in sales may
increase the consumers’ expected utility. By tying their products, the
firms insure consumers against uncertain future demand.
Keywords: Tie-in sales, leverage theory of tying, competition, expected
utility.
JEL-Classification Numbers: D21, D31, D43, L11
∗Universität Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut, Abteilung für Wirtschaftstheorie,
Gesellschaftsstrasse 49, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland, alain.egli@vwi.unibe.ch. I thank
Winand Emons, Armin Hartmann, Thomas Liebi and Gerd Muehlheusser for helpful dis-
cussions.
1 Introduction
Tie-in sales force the buyer of a product (tying good) to buy one or more
other goods (tied good) exclusively from the same supplier. A classic example
of tie-in sales is the former IBM selling rule. IBM required its lessees of com-
puting machines to purchase the associated punching cards from IBM too.
Another example are blade holders and blades. By technical means blade
holder manufacturers force their customers to also purchase their blades.
Printers and ink cartridges, electric toothbrush and brushes, or hot glue gun
and glue sticks are other examples of tie-in sales.
One of the most cited and contended rationale for tie-in sales is the lever-
age theory of tying. This theory holds that a firm may try to leverage its
monopoly power from one market to another where it faces competition.
Consider a multiproduct firm which is monopolist in a specific market and
one of many competitors in the other markets. By tying, the monopolist
links the purchase of the monopolized good to the purchase of the competi-
tively sold good. The tying firm extends its monopoly power to competitive
markets to strengthen its position there. Exponents of the leverage theory
attribute anticompetitive effects to such a behavior. Whinston (1990) de-
scribes leverage as a mechanism to foreclose sales in the competitive market,
thereby monopolizing it. Carbajo, De Meza and Seidman (1990) find that
bundling, a special form of tying, causes rivals in the competitive market to
act less aggressively.
In most leverage models firm j has a monopoly in one market and faces
(imperfect) competition in another. The classic tie-in example fits this de-
scription very well: IBM has a monopoly position in the market for comput-
ing machines and faces competition in the market for punching cards. But
is the assumption that only firm j has a monopoly in one market appropri-
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ate for all cases? Take for instance the shaving systems industry. This case
describes a symmetric market structure. We understand symmetric as two
firms j and i competing in one market and having some market power in
the other market. Competition prevails in the market for blade holders. But
as soon as customers buy a holder from firm j, they are forced to buy the
blades from the same firm j. Customers do so unless it pays to buy blade
holder and blades from firm i. Hence, firm j has a monopoly in the market
for blades with respect to all customers who buy holders from firm j. The
same is true for firm i. This symmetric structure holds for many real world
situations.
In our model consumers do not know if they need to shave little or a lot.
Therefore, expenditures for blades are uncertain. Ex ante, the consumers
have an expected utility from shaving. We are interested in the effects of
tying on buyers’ expected utility. Therefore, we compare the situation under
tie-in sales with independent pricing. Under independent pricing the firms do
not tie their products. We show that consumers may enjoy a higher expected
utility under tie-in sales than under independent pricing. The leverage of
tying does not necessarily have anti-competitive effects. Especially, tie-in
sales may insure buyers against uncertain future demand just because of
leveraging. If the firms use tie-in sales, the consumers must buy the holder
and blades from the same firm. Due to competition in the handle market,
shaving system suppliers price the handle below marginal costs to attract
consumers. Thereby, the firms set blade prices above marginal costs and
earn positive profits in the blade market. The firms do so because they can
compensate losses on the handles with profits on the blades. In our model
such tie-in sales reduce the variance of consumers’ expenditures compared
to selling the goods independently. If consumers are risk averse they can be
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better off under tie-ins than under independent pricing.
Like the leverage theory of tying, the literature about tie-in sales and
risk reduction uses the approach with a monopoly in the tying good market.
Burstein (1988) states that tying contracts combined with leases insure the
risk averse lessee against uncertain future demand. Such a tying arrangement
can achieve the effects of variable rental arrangements. Suppose a seller needs
a machine and material to produce a good. How much material the seller
processes depends on uncertain demand for her good. Leasing the machine
and buying the material also from the lessor allows the lessee to use the
machine at a variable renting price.
In line with the preceding rationale for tie-ins, Liebowitz (1983) describes
various agreements between a provider and a purchaser of a machine with a
belonging commodity. He finds that tie-in sales reduce a firm’s performance
risk. Especially, the risk reduction hypothesis can also explain the lowered
price of the tying good and the raised price for the tied good.
Firms may use tie-in sales to speed early adoption of a new capital good.
Lunn (1990) illustrates this variant of the risk reduction rationale for tying
contracts. A firm markets a new capital-embodied innovation. Potential
users are uncertain about the innovation’s usefulness and profitability. To
encourage the new product’s early adoption the innovator offers a tying con-
tract. Purchasers buy (lease) the innovation tied to the purchase of some
other innovator’s product. By lowering the (rental) price on the tying prod-
uct and raising the tied good’s price above the competitive level, the seller
reduces the risk to the buyer (lessee).
A more formal approach by Kamecke (1998) develops the risk-reduction
hypothesis further. A monopolist with private information about the quality
of a basic product overcomes informational inefficiency by tying in a comple-
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mentary commodity. Selling the basic product at a low price and the tied
good at a supracompetitive level signals the basic product’s high quality. Tie-
in sales serve as an instrument to send price signals which overcome problems
of asymmetric information in the introductory phase of a new durable prod-
uct.
In section 2 we describe a model with consumers which have perfectly cor-
related demand. All consumers have either the same high or low demand for
blades. To obtain a benchmark, section 3.1 solves the model under indepen-
dent pricing. The following section determines the equilibrium if the firms
use tie-in sales. Section 3.3 compares the outcomes from sections 3.1 and
3.2. Section 4 introduces a more fundamental utility function and consumers
who are different ex post. In sections 4.1 and 4.2 we derive the firms’ pricing
behavior when consumers are heterogeneous and demand for blades is not
completely inelastic. Next, we analyze the effects from tying on consumers’
utility in the extended framework. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a set of identical consumers of measure 1. Consumers want to shave,
say. To do so, they need a blade holder and one set of blades. Products are
bundled as follows: A is a blade holder plus one set of blades. B is just a
set of blades. Consumers’ willingness to pay for A is r. If the consumer has
a blade holder, her willingness to pay for B is also r. Because the consumer
can shave when buying good A or buying good B while having a holder, the
reservation price is the same for good A and B. In the following we stick to
the willingness to pay as maximum amount of money buyers are willing to
give up for the benefit from shaving. Hence, the reservation price represents
4
the monetary benefit of being well shaved. With probability π consumers’
demand for good B is low, ql. Demand is high, qh, with probability 1−π. We
assume that customers’ demands are perfectly correlated. The realization of
high or low demand is the same for all consumers. Demand is thus completely
inelastic up to the reservation price. With probability π consumers demand
the amount ql of good B if the price is less or equal to r. Otherwise, demand
for good B is zero. Analogously, demand is qh with probability 1− π if good
B’s price does not exceed consumers’ willingness to pay. The reservation
price is common knowledge. Each consumer has initial income I. Income is
such that spending for shaving is small relative to income. In sections 3.2
and 4.2 we show that the price for a set of blades does not exceed the price
for package A, pA ≥ pB. Thus, the consumers buy package B if they already
have a handle. The consumers’ utilities are
U(r, pA, pB) =



U(I + r − pA + ql(r − pB)) if demand is low,
U(I + r − pA + qh(r − pB)) if demand is high.
The utility function U(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, that is
U ′(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) < 0. Concavity of the expected utility function implies
risk aversion. Buying good A and good B at prices pA and pB generates
expected utility:
E[U ] = πU(I + r − pA + ql(r − pB)) + (1 − π)U(I + r − pA + qh(r − pB)).
Two firms serve markets A and B. The costs are the same for both firms.
Fixed costs are zero. Marginal costs are cA for good A and cB for good B.
Unit costs for good A are higher than for good B. For simplicity marginal
costs for blades are equal to or greater than one. Furthermore, marginal costs
are smaller than the consumers’ willingness to pay, r > cA > cB ≥ 1. This
assumption ensures that the consumer buys the goods if priced at marginal
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costs. Firm j, j = 1, 2, offers the goods at prices pjA and pjB. The firms
compete in standard Bertrand manner in both markets. Potential demand
is one in market A and q ∈ {ql, qh} with ql > 1 in market B.
If the firms do not tie, good A is compatible with the other firm’s good
B. The consumers can use blades from firm 1 in conjunction with blade
holders from firm 2 and vice versa. In contrast to independent pricing, tie-in
sales restrict the consumers in using good A with the competitor’s good B.
If firms price independently, firm j faces demand DjA(p1A, p2A) for good A,
and DjB(p1B, p2B) for B,
DjA =



1 if pjA < piA,
0.5 if pjA = piA,
0 if pjA > piA
and DjB =



q if pjB < piB,
0.5q if pjB = piB,
0 if pjB > piB.
We analyze a two stage game for independent pricing and tying. Inde-
pendent pricing allows buyers to combine the firms’ products. Tying coerces
consumers to buy good B associated with good A, i.e. both goods from the
same firm.
At the first stage firms simultaneously choose prices pjA for good A. By
assumption this price holds for the first and second period1. Then, consumers
buy good A and payoffs in market A are realized. Given first stage prices and
demand, firms simultaneously choose prices pjB in market B at the second
stage. Similar to the first stage, consumers purchase good B in the second
stage and firms earn profits. We assume that, at the beginning of stage 2,
all players know if total demand q for good B is low or high. We solve the
game by backwards induction. In short, the events take place as follows:
1The assumption that package A’s prices remain fixed prevents consumers from waiting
until stage 2 to buy the holder. We exclude the sequential pricing problem arising from
durable goods to focus on the tie-ins’ effect on competition.
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Stage 1: The firms simultaneously choose prices for package A. Consumers
buy good A and payoffs are realized.
Stage 2: At first, all players learn if demand q is high or low. The firms si-
multaneously set the price for good B. Consumers purchase the blades
from the original firm or switch seller. Firms and consumers realize
their payoffs.
3 Homogeneous Consumers With Perfectly
Correlated Demand
3.1 Independent Pricing
In this section we derive the firms’ behavior without tying. We refer to these
results as the independent pricing equilibrium, (IP ).
Suppose we are at stage 2. Then, whatever happened in stage 1, both
firms set prices equal marginal costs, pjB = cB for j = 1, 2. Given that the
firms price at marginal costs in stage 2, they will also price at marginal costs
in stage 1. The standard Bertrand result that prices equal marginal costs is
the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In the independent pricing equilibrium firms set prices equal
to marginal costs in all markets.
3.2 Tie-In Sales
At the second stage, firm j is a monopolist for customers who bought good A
from j. But firm j can not extract consumers’ surplus without restrictions.
First, the price for B does not exceed the firm’s own price for good A,
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pB ≤ pA. If this were the case, consumers would substitute B by A. Firm
j’s profits would drop because marginal costs for B are lower than for A.
Secondly, consumers can change their supplier. Consumers switch as soon as
their utility is higher by buying an access package A and q − 1 units of B
from the initial seller’s rival than by buying q units of B from the initial firm.
In the second stage, demand corresponds to the demand for B. Package A
renders the same utility as already having a holder and buying B. Therefore,
consumers buy q − 1 packages B if they switch supplier. Formally, the no-
switching condition is as follows:
U
(
I − pTjA + q(r − pjB)
)
≥ U
(
I − pTjA + r − p
T
iA + (q − 1)(r − piB)
)
Note that the benefit from shaving in the first stage does not appear in the
no-switching condition. The consumers used up the blades contained in A.
Firm j ensures that the consumers who bought its package A do not
change firm. Then, firm j serves the fraction D∗jA corresponding to the
amount of sold packages A in stage 1. Total demand is qD∗jA. In the second
stage, firm j maximizes its profit subject to pjB ≤ p
T
jA and the no-switching
condition:
max
pjB
qD∗jA(pjB − cB)
s.t.
pjB ≤ p
T
jA,
pjB ≤
pTiA + (q − 1)piB
q
,
where pTjA denotes firm j’s price for the first good set at stage 1. The no-
switching condition also implies that firm j does not set a price for B above
firm i’s price for A:
pjB ≤
pTiA + (q − 1)piB
q
≤ pTiA.
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Because profits are increasing in the price for B, firm j sets its price as
high as possible. We now show that the firms set prices for B equal to their
prices for A. Assume firm j charges a price pjB ≤ (p
T
iA+(q−1)piB)/q and firm
i sets piB = p
T
iA. Then, firm j’s price for B is pjB ≤ p
T
iA. This is equivalent
to the first constraint, because firm j’s price for A is smaller or equal to firm
i’s price. Otherwise, firm j did not sell any holders in stage 1. Now, assume
the firms set prices
p1B =
(pT2A + (q − 1)p2B)
q
,
p2B =
(pT1A + (q − 1)p1B)
q
.
The solution to this system of equations is pTjB = p
T
jA. Consequently, firm j
sets the same price for B as for A.
With the pricing behavior at the second stage we now turn to the first
stage. The firms are no longer monopolists, they compete in prices for good
A demand. Consumers buy from the firm whose prices guarantee a higher
expected utility. Anticipating second stage prices the consumers’ expected
utilities when buying from firm j is:
πU(I + r − pjA + ql(r − p
T
jB)) + (1 − π)U(I + r − pjA + qh(r − p
T
jB)).
Because the firms’ pricing behavior is the same at the second stage, con-
sumers buy from the firm with the lower good A price. Consequently, the
standard Bertrand argument holds and the firms drive each other down to
zero profits. But not only profits on product A are zero, expected overall
profits Πj are zero. So, the firms set the price p
T
jA such that overall profits
are zero:
Πj =
[
(pTjA − cA) + πql(p
T
jB − cB) + (1 − π)qh(p
T
jB − cB)
]
= 0.
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Plugging in the result from stage 2, pTjB = p
T
jA, firm j’s price for A is
pTjA =
cA + cB(πql + (1 − π)qh)
1 + πql + (1 − π)qh
.
Multiplying cA and cB with the denominator of equilibrium prices gives:
cB(1 + πql + (1 − π)qh) < cA + cB(πql + (1 − π)qh) < cA(1 + πql + (1 − π)qh).
Because cA > cB equilibrium prices lie between marginal costs.
Proposition 2 In the tie-in sales equilibrium the firms set the same price
pTjA for both products. The price for good A is below marginal costs cA and
the price for good B is above marginal costs cB. Each firm serves half the
market.
3.3 Comparison of Consumers’ Utility
Because the firms’ behavior is symmetric we suppress the index j in the
following. According to proposition 1, prices equal marginal costs under
independent pricing. If the firms use tie-in sales they set the same price for
each good. Then, the consumers expect the utility E[UIP ] under independent
pricing and utility E[UT ] under tying:
E[UIP ] = πU(I + r − cA + ql(r − cB)) + (1 − π)U(I + r − cA + qh(r − cB)),
E[UT ] = πU(I + (1 + ql)(r − p
T
A)) + (1 − π)U(I + (1 + qh)(r − p
T
A)).
Let the arguments in the utility function be consumers’ wealth. If de-
mand is low, consumers’ wealth is higher under tying than under indepen-
dent pricing. However, if consumers have high demand, tie-in sales lead to
lower wealth than independent selling does. Hence, consumers enjoy higher
expected utility with tie-in sales if demand is low and expect lower utility if
10
demand is high. Figure 1 shows graphically that expected utility under ty-
ing lies above expected utility under independent pricing. Because expected
wealth is the same for the two selling regimes consumers have higher expected
utility under tying. 
Expected Wealth x 
U(x) 
E[UIP] 
E[UT] 
Figure 1: Expected Utility
To see the tie-ins’ favorable effect for risk averse consumers let the con-
sumers’ wealth from a close and comfortable shave be lotteries. The lottery
under independent pricing LIP pays r − cA + ql(r − cB) with probability π
and r− cA + qh(r− cB) with probability 1−π. Tying is the lottery LT which
gives (1+ ql)(r−p
T
A) if demand is low and (1+ qh)(r−p
T
A) if demand is high.
The expected value is the same for both lotteries. But the lotteries’ risks
measured by their variance differ. Since the tie-in price is higher than B’s
marginal costs the tying lottery exhibits a smaller variance.
V ar[LIP ] = (r − cB)
2π(1 − π)(qh − ql)
2
> (r − pTA)
2π(1 − π)(qh − ql)
2 = V ar[LT ]
Since consumers are risk averse they are better off under tying. If the firms
tie their products, they set prices for the holder with blades below marginal
costs. For blades only, the price is above marginal costs. The consumers
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benefit from the reduced good A price with certainty. Whereas the higher
blade prices adversely affect the buyers only with some probability. Tie-in
sales insure consumers against uncertain future demand.
4 Consumer Heterogeneity and a More Fun-
damental Utility Function
Hitherto, demand for package B is exogenous and the same for all consumers.
A more fundamental utility function endogenizes demand for B. This exten-
sion also entails that the demand in the second stage is no longer completely
inelastic. The strictly concave function U(·) defined on individuals’ incomes
and benefits from a clean shave exhibits risk aversion. However, the marginal
benefit from shaving decreases as the number of shaves increase. Consumers’
utility is
U(r, pA, pB) = U(I − pA + r ln(q + 1) − pBq),
where q is demand for blades only. Buying package A and q units of package
B renders benefit r ln(q + 1). The willingness to pay r ∈ [r, r] is a random
variable with uniform distribution. Consumers and firms both know the
reservation price’s density function f(r) = 1/(r − r). The reservation price’s
lower bound is greater than the marginal costs for A. This assumption en-
sures that consumers buy package A even if their demand for subsequent
blades was zero.
The game’s timing remains unchanged. Ex ante, the reservation price r
is unknown. The consumers learn their reservation price at the second stage,
after buying package A.
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4.1 Independent Pricing
At the second stage consumers buy blades from the cheaper supplier because
they can freely combine handle and blades. Therefore, firms price B at
marginal costs. Given the prices for good B equal marginal costs, the firms
also charge marginal costs for good A in the first stage. Proposition 1 still
holds.
4.2 Tie-In Sales
After buying package A, consumers only demand blades at the second stage.
Knowing their reservation prices, consumers demand q units of package B.
Note that buyers used up package A’s blades. Thus, only shaves in the
second stage yield a benefit. A consumer with reservation price r demands
the amount q which maximizes his utility. Let q∗(r, pB) denote the consumers’
optimal demand for B at price pB depending on their willingness to pay:
q∗(r, pB) = arg max
q
U(I − pA + r ln(q) − pBq).
The first order condition for the consumers’ maximization problem deter-
mines the optimal demand q∗(r, pB) = r/pB. Because any critical point of a
concave function is a global maximizer, q∗(r, pB) is the optimal demand in
stage two for a consumer who is willing to pay r.
If the firms tie their goods, they have monopoly power in the second
stage. Like in section 3.2 two restrictions limit this monopoly power. First,
the firms do not price package B higher than package A. Secondly, buyers
still can change firms. Therefore, it is possible that firm j does not sell B
to all consumers who initially bought A from j. Consumers with j’s handle
buy good B from firm j or buy A and subsequent goods B from i. If the
consumers’ utility is higher in the latter case, they switch firm. Denote the
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individual who is indifferent between staying at firm j and switching to firm
i by r̂j. Then, firm j supplies the set R̂j of consumers. If firm j served the
fraction α of consumers in the first stage it’s maximization problem in the
second stage is:
max
pjB
α(pjB − cB)
∫
R̂j
q∗ (r, pjB) f(r)dr
s.t.
pjB ≤ p
T
jA,
r ln(q∗(r, pjB)) − (q
∗(r, pjB)) pjB
≥ r ln(q∗(r, piB)) − (q
∗(r, piB) − 1) piB − p
T
iA.
Again, we show that the price for B equals the price for A. Consider the
firms’ no switching constraints for the indifferent consumers:
r̂j ln
(
r̂j
pjB
)
− r̂j = r̂i ln
(
r̂i
piB
)
− r̂i + piB − p
T
iA
r̂i ln
(
r̂i
piB
)
− r̂i = r̂j ln
(
r̂j
pjB
)
− r̂j + pjB − p
T
jA
The consumer with reservation price r̂j initially bought A from firm j and
is indifferent between buying q∗ sets of B from j and buying A plus q∗ − 1
sets of B from i. In the same way, the consumer with r̂i who first purchased
i’s holder is indifferent between staying with i and switching to firm j. We
next show that these indifferent consumers have the same willingness to pay,
r̂j = r̂i.
Assume the situation r̂i < r̂j. Further, suppose that consumers with
r > r̂j stay with firm j while consumers with r < r̂i stick to firm i as
depicted in figure 2. However, it is impossible then that consumers with
r ∈ [r̂i, r̂j] change from j to i while consumers with the same reservation
prices switch from i to j. Hence, r̂i ≥ r̂j.
14
 
 
 
jr̂ir̂ r  r
consumer 
r> jr̂ stays at firm j 
consumer r> ir̂ switches from firm i to firm j consumer 
r< ir̂ stays at firm i 
consumer r< jr̂ switches from firm j to firm i 
Figure 2: Firms’ Indifferent Consumers with r̂i < r̂j
Now assume r̂i > r̂j and consumers with r > r̂j stay with firm j while
consumers with r < r̂i stick to firm i. Figure 3 illustrates this situation.
Then, a consumer with reservation price r̂i who initially bought from firm
 
 
 
ir̂jr̂ r  r
consumer r> jr̂ stays at firm j 
consumer r> ir̂ switches 
from firm i to firm j 
consumer r< ir̂ stays at firm i 
consumer r< jr̂ switches 
from firm j to firm i 
Figure 3: Firms’ Indifferent Consumers with r̂i > r̂j
j has a higher utility than the indifferent consumer r̂i who initially bought
from firm i.
r̂i ln
(
r̂i
pjB
)
− r̂i > r̂i ln
(
r̂i
piB
)
− r̂i + piB − piA.
Obviously, r ln(r/pB)−r is decreasing in pB for all r. The consequence is that
firm i’s price for package B is higher than firm j’s price, pjB < piB. Similarly,
a consumer with willingness to pay r̂j who initially bought from firm i must
have a higher utility than the indifferent consumer r̂j. It follows that piB <
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pjB which contradicts the first consequence and hence the assumption r̂i > r̂j
is not valid.
It follows from the analysis above that the firms’ indifferent consumers
have the same willingness to pay r̂. Substituting firm j’s LHS of the no-
switching condition into i’s RHS gives pTiA − piB = pjB − p
T
jA. Only identical
prices for package A and B solve this equation, pTjA = pjB, j = 1, 2.
Given the pricing behavior at the second stage, the firms set prices for
good A at the first stage. Like in section 3.2, the firms use second stage
profits to subsidize price reductions for A to compete for demand. The firms
charge the price for handle with blades such that overall profits from selling
package A and B are zero. Accordingly, the price pjA solves the equation
πj = pjA − cA + (pjB − cB)E[q
∗(r, pB)] = 0.
At the first stage, firm j expects demand E[q∗(r, pjB)] = (r + r)/(2pB) =
µr/pB for blades. Plugging consumers’ expected demand in firm j’s zero
profit condition and replacing blade price by the price for the access package
gives a cubic equation in pjA. The solution for pjA ∈ R
+ is:
pTjA = p
T
jB =
1
2
cA −
1
2
µr +
1
2
√
(µr − cA)
2 + 4µrcB.
Easy algebra shows that the price pTjA is always positive. Furthermore,
the price is smaller than package A’s marginal costs and greater than B’s
marginal costs. Finally, Proposition 2 still holds.
4.3 Comparison of Consumers’ Utility
Because demand for package B is not completely inelastic the effects from tie-
in sales are ambiguous. The utility function’s general form precludes a direct
comparison between expected utility under tying and independent pricing.
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Therefore, we point out the combinations under which tie-ins provide the
buyers a higher expected utility.
Let the argument in the utility function be consumers’ wealth again.
Then, the selling scheme with higher expected wealth and lower variation
is superior. We first show that wealth’s variance under tying is lower than
under independent pricing. Then, we characterize the cost values for which
tying leads to higher wealth compared to marginal pricing.
In the following analysis we neglect the income I. Income is deterministic
and equal under the two selling schemes. The benefit from shaving in mon-
etary terms is a random variable W = r ln(r/pB + 1) − r − pA. The general
form for a random variables’ spread assigns wealth’s variance as
σ2W = E
[(
r ln
(
r
pB
+ 1
)
− r
)2
]
−
(
E
[
r ln
(
r
pB
+ 1
)
− r
])2
.
Note that the variance is independent of A’s price. The consumers always
buy package A and know its price with certainty. So, pA has no effect on
wealth’s variance. Differentiating the variance with respect to the price pB
gives
∂σ2W
∂pB
= − 2E
[(
r ln
(
r
pB
+ 1
)
− r
)
r2
rpB + p2B
]
+ 2E
[
r ln
(
r
pB
+ 1
)
− r
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(r)
E
[
r2
rpB + p2B
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(r)
.
Denote the first term inside the expectation by f(r) and the second term
by g(r). The function g(r)’s derivative with respect to r is always positive.
Differentiating the other function f(r) makes
ln
(
r
pB
+ 1
)
+
r
r + pB
− 1.
If the price for package B equals the consumers’ willingness to pay, the dif-
ferential ∂f(r)/∂r is ln(2)+0.5r−1. We remember that the reservation price
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is greater than one. The price for B is smaller than the willingness to pay.
Therefore, f(r) also increases in r. The Fortuin-Kasteleyn-Ginibre-inequality
states, for two increasing functions f and g and any random variable R, that
E[f(R)g(R)] ≥ E[f(R)]E[g(R)]. Applying this fact on the variance’s deriva-
tive shows that wealth’s variation does not depend positively on the price for
package B, ∂σ2W /∂pB ≤ 0. Under tying the price for blades is always higher
than under marginal pricing. Thus, the variation in consumers’ wealth de-
creases if firms tie their products.
To pin down the conditions under which tie-ins lead to higher utility
consider the consumers’ expected wealth
E[W ] = E
[
r ln
(
r
pB
+ 1
)]
− µr − pA.
Bear in mind that prices satisfy the firms’ zero profit condition. Then, the
price for package A is a function of the price for package B, pA(pB) = cA −
µr + µrcB/pB. Plugging in pA(pB) and differentiating expected wealth with
respect to pB is
1
p2B
(
−E
[
r2pB
r + pB
]
+ µrcB
)
.
If ∂E[W ]/∂pB is positive, consumers expect higher wealth when the price
for B increases. On one hand, a reduction in the price for A has a positive
effect on wealth. On the other hand, the price reduction negatively effects
the monetary benefit from shaving. Consumers expect higher wealth if the
positive effect outweighs the negative,
µrcB ≥ E
[
r2pB
r + pB
]
.
The adverse effect due to a price increase is highest for the willingness to
pay’s upper bound. Let then pB denote the price which solves the above
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equation evaluated at r. Tie-in sales yield a higher expected wealth than
marginal pricing if the tying price pTA is smaller than this critical value pB:
pTA =
1
2
cA −
1
2
µr +
1
2
√
c2A − 2cAµr + µ
2
r + 4µrcB ≤
µrcBr
r2 − µrcB
= pB.
For all values cA which solve the above inequality p
T
A ≤ pB tie-in sales gen-
erate at least the same expected wealth as independent pricing does. The
upper bound for package A’s marginal costs is then
cA ≤
3r2µrcB + µrr
3 − µ2rcBr − µ
2
rc
2
B − r
4
r(r − µrcB)
.
Marginal costs for A are greater than the costs for B. The upper limit for
package A’s marginal costs must also be greater than B’s marginal costs.
Solving cB < cA bounds cB above at r(r−µr)/µr. At last, consumers expect
higher wealth under tying if marginal costs are small enough, that is
cA ≤
3r2µrcB + µrr
3 − µ2rcBr − µ
2
rc
2
B − r
4
r(r − µrcB)
,
cB < r(r − µr)/µr.
Yet, tie-in sales insure consumers against uncertainty. Under tying the
variation in wealth is smaller than under independent pricing. But expected
wealth can be higher if the firms price at marginal costs. Tie-in sales increase
the price for B. A higher price pB has two negative effects. First, the
spending for B increases and, second, the benefit from shaving decreases. The
positive effect due to a price decrease in good A does not always compensate
the negative effects in good B. Risk averse buyers account for expected
wealth and its variance. If marginal pricing leads to higher wealth the utility
function’s general form makes a clear statement impossible. The increase in
utility due to higher wealth can outweigh the utility decrease from a higher
variance. However, marginal costs small enough allow an assertion. In this
case, consumers prefer tie-in sales to independent pricing.
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5 Conclusions
This paper introduces tie-in sales in a symmetric setting with price compe-
tition. We analyze the case of two firms. Each firm sells two goods. A good
example is the market for shaving systems. The razor basically consists of a
razor holder and blades. We compare the outcome under tie-in sales with the
benchmark independent pricing. If the firms do not tie, a firm’s own goods
are independent of each other. Under tying the firms design their products
such that their parts are not compatible with other firms’ components. Tie-
in sales allow the firms to create monopolies in one of the two markets. The
firms earn positive profits on the monopolized products. Because of compe-
tition in the market for the access good the firms drive each other down to
zero overall profits. They use the profits from monopolized goods to subsi-
dize losses in the competitive market. Although the firms tie their products,
the symmetry in the firms’ market power maintains price competition.
Beside the firms’ behavior we examine the effects from tie-in sales on
consumers’ expected utility. The buyers are uncertain about their future
spending. Before buying the holder, the consumers do not know their future
demand. In a simple model, risk averse consumers who are homogeneous
have completely inelastic demand. If demand is completely inelastic, tie-in
sales insure the buyers against uncertainty in expenditures. The consumers
prefer tie-in sales to independent pricing. We extend the simple model by
relaxing the assumption of completely inelastic demand and allowing for con-
sumer heterogeneity. In the extended version the tying’s effect is ambiguous.
Tie-in sales still have an insurance effect. But demand is no longer completely
inelastic and thus the benefits from shaving decrease under tie-in sales. How-
ever, we characterize cost combinations which lead to higher expected utility
under tie-in sales than under independent pricing.
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